American University International Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 6

Article 5

2000

Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in
International Economic Law
Chi Camody

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carmody, Chi. "Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law." American University International Law
Review 15, no. 6 (2000): 1321-1346.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

BEYOND THE PROPOSALS: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW

CHI CARMODY.

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 1321
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW .................. 1327
A. THE W ORLD BANK .......................................

1327

B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ...................

1334

C. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION .......................

1338

Ill. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......... 1341

I. INTRODUCTION
The 1990s saw a flurry of proposals to enhance public participation in international economic law. There were numerous calls to
make the Bretton Woods institutions - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF" or "Fund"), and the World Trade Organization ("WTO") - more transparent and publicly accountable.' In

* Assisitant Professor, Faculty of Law. University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7. Email: ecarmody(ajulian.uwo.ca. The writer
would like to thank the Law Foundation of Ontario, and in particular Acting Dean
Albert Oosterhoff of the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, for having
made attendance possible at the IELG-ASIL Annual Meeting.
1. The Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 foresaw the creation of three
international organizations to oversee international economic affairs after World
War II. These eventually took shape in the form of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank"), the International Monetary Fund
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part, this was due to new awareness of globalization and the importance of these institutions. It was also due to diminished faith in the
ability of governments to represent all points of view, a sentiment
which made the traditionally state-centered structure of many organizations, including those of Bretton Woods, appear underinclusive
and inadequate.
Enough time has passed for these proposals to be put into practice
and it is useful, both for purposes of immediate comparison and
longer term assessment, to examine what has happened. Have the
initiatives truly made meaningful change? Are the actors any different than they were in the past? Have they really enhanced voice, and
if so, whose voice? What are the pitfalls they present, particularly in
terms of liability, conflict of interest, and the prosecution of frivolous
claims? What is it that can be said about this trend that is unique to
the economic nature of the institutions involved?
It is too early to offer a definitive answer, but if we are to offer a
tentative one it is that informal publicparticipation-meetings,symposia, and other types of consultative dialogue-have been moderately successful, while formal public participation-onsubmissions
made in the context of systems of dispute settlement-has been disappointing. The Bretton Woods institutions have done a reasonable
job of building links with governments and non-govemmental organizations ("NGOs"). Until recently, however, they have been less
successful in going beyond these traditional constituencies and in
making contact with a wider audience in civil society.
On the informal side, the absolute number of activities is impressive. Each of the Bretton Woods institutions conducts a staggering
number of missions, visits to headquarters, conferences, and other
("IMF" or "Fund"), and the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
GATT came into being in 1948 and is not traditionally considered a Bretton
Woods institution, but it is so referred to for ease of reference. In April 1994, the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") succeeded the GATT. See J.H. JACKSON, TIlE

WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 27-30 (1989). For a criticism of, and proposals for enhanced participation in, the Bretton Woods institutions see Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996) (asserting that the WTO should provide
systematic participation rights for NGOs) and G. Richard Shell, The Trade
Stakeholders: Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996) (stating that "global economic integration" will force the WTO to become more transparent).
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activities designed to promote each institution's agenda.2 While in
some instances these are mandated,' in others they are spontaneous.
What the numbers do not reveal, however, is the quality of these
contacts and the degree to which they are able to penetrate deeply
into civil society. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, time and again,
representatives of these institutions continue to have contact with the
same people, principally government and NGO figures.' Hence, the
process of consultation often becomes a kind of managed dialogue
among elites rather than a forum for authentic popular expression.
Some changes are now evident, but in large part the Bretton Woods
institutions continue to maintain contact with opinion leaders.
On the formal side, this tendency towards managed conversation
appears even more pronounced. The number of public submissions
have been small, particularly when measured against the membership
of each institution covering most of the world's population. The
World Bank Inspection Panel ("Inspection Panel"), the most com2. The IMF now estimates that it provides approximately 300 person years of
technical assistance to IMF member countries, up from 70 in 1970. The Fund also
conducts training courses at centers in Washington, Vienna, Singapore, and other
regional and subregional locations. In June 1998, the Fund's Executive Board reviewed its approach to external communications, and in 1999 the Fund opened a
new public outreach center and hired external consultants "'to offer recommendations for improving ways in which it communicates information about its work to
the public." See WORLD BANK, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 154-55; WORLD BANK,
1999 ANNUAL REPORT 177-79 [hereinafter WORLD BANK 1999]. The 1999 annual
report notes that NGO/civil society collaboration on Bank-sponsored projects has
increased from 28% during the 1987-1996 period to 52% in 1999. See idL at 139.
3. See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15 1994, Annex 2, art. V(2); 33 I.L.M. 1144 (stating
that the WTO's General Council may consult and work in cooperation with NGOs
on matter relating to the WTO's activities); WTO General Council, Guidelines for
Arrangements on Relations with Non-governmental Organizations, WT/I 162
(July 23, 1996); Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes [hereinafter DSU], WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, art.
27(3); 33 I.L.M. 1226 (explaining the WTO Secretariat's role in conducting voluntary training courses for Members concerning the WTO's dispute settlement
procedures and practices to better inform Members' experts in this regard); see
also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. Vlll:5(c)
(noting that by acting as a focal point for the compilation and exchange of information, the Fund will help to lay the groundwork for studies designed to assist
members in forming policies to further the Fund's purposes).
4. Discussion of author with Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Senior Counsel,
World Bank, Washington (Feb. 17, 2000).
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prehensive system of formal participation examined here, has registered only eighteen complaints against Bank-financed projects to
February 2000; in only six instances has the Inspection Panel conducted investigations or quasi-investigations, or kept a matter under
review.' The record among the Bank's regional affiliates is even
more limited.
The WTO Appellate Body has received only two submissions
since its landmark decision on public participation in United States
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,6 rendered in October 1998. 7 The WTO has yet to adopt a standard oper-

5. See The Inspection Panel Register (visited June 9, 2000) <http://wblnOO18.
worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf/WRegister?openview> (listing the formal requests
and investigations of World Bank financial projects).
6. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Appellate Body Ruling]
(holding that that an individual or body could ask a WTO dispute settlement panel
for permission to file a statement or a brief). See id. para. 107. The Appellate Body
also held that a WTO member country could decide to append materials from nongovernmental sources in their WTO submissions. See id. para. 109.
7. See Australia - Measures Concerning Importation of Salmon, WT/DS 18/1R
(June 12, 1998). Two Tasmanian salmon farmers made the submission in compliance proceedings brought by Canada. See id. Canada alleged, pursuant to Article
21(5) of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, that Australia has failed to comply with findings made by the
WTO panel and Appellate Body. See id. In Australia -- Measures Concerning Exportation of Salmon (WT/DS18/RW) (Feb. 18, 2000), the reconvened panel examining Australian compliance under DSU Art.21.5 received a communication
from two salmon farmers. The report describes the submission as follows:
On 25 November 1999, the Panel received a letter from "Concerned Fishermen and Processors" in South Australia. The letter addresses the treatment by
Australia of, on the one hand, imports of pilchards for use as bait or fish feed
and, on the other hand, imports of salmon. The Panel considered the inflormation submitted in the letter as relevant to its procedures and has accepted this
information as part of the record. It did so pursuant to the authority granted to
the Panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU.
In particular, the Panel observed that the information submitted had a direct
bearing on a claim that was already raised by Canada, namely inconsistency in the
sense of Art. 5.5 of the WTO Sanitary and PhytosanitaryAgreement in the treatment by Australia of pilchard versus salmon imports.
In addition, the Appellate Body received submissions from the American Iron
and Steel Institute and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America in United
States-Inposition of CountervailingDuties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismouth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom
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ating procedure for dealing with submissions of this type. Moreover,
if we look at the persons making those submissions, they often comprise well-established NGOs or entities working with them. This implies that there are significant barriers to direct participation by other
members of the public in terms of resources, time, and talent.
Obviously, the way in which the foregoing is presented suggests
that something is wrong. Maybe it isn't. In the past decade, however,
each of the three Bretton Woods institutions have been the subject of
what David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla refer to as an "NGO swarm"
-the pursuit by "amorphous groups of NGOs, linked online, descending on a target."8 The "Fifty Years is Enough" campaign of
1994 first targeted the World Bank. A similar phenomenon took
place during the IMF Annual Meeting in April 1998. This "NGO
swarm" affected the WTO at its Seattle Ministerial Conference in
December 1999. In each instance, NGOs' public criticisms led to institutional soul-searching.
What appears wrong, paradoxically, is that much about these institutions seemed right. In the 1990s two of the three institutions
adopted binding systems of dispute settlement; all had committed
themselves to decision-making with a "human face;" ' and all had
embarked on outreach programs, including an electronic presence.
Somehow, though, these plans and changes were not enough. I
would ascribe this to the fact that the mechanisms of public participation were, and in some important aspects remain, remote. They
have forged important links with NGOs, but they have not gone be(WT/DS138/AB/R - May 10, 2000). It is observed, however, that "we have not
found it necessary to take the two anicus curiae briefs filed into account in rendering our decision." (para. 42). A brief was submitted by the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) in panel proceedings in United
States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. CopyrightAct (WT'DSI60/R -June 15, 2000).
However, none of the parties involved decided to appeal the case, so the submission will not be considered by the Appellate Body.
8. See The Non-governmental Order, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at 21
(mentioning the Rand Corporation study in which Arquilla and Ronfeldt coined the
phrase "NGO swarm").
9. See J.H. Weaver & K.M. O'Keefe, Whither Development Economics?, I I
SAIS REV. 113, 128-29 (1991) (setting forth the elements of "laissez-faire with a
human face," which include (1) orthodox macroeconomic policies, (2) more emphasis on human development and poverty reduction, (3) rural and agricultural
transformation, and (4) promoting urban and industrial restructuring).
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yond. They have focused on educating public officials, but not the
public itself. In short, the Bretton Woods institutions have not appealed to the grassroots of civil society. For example, we do not see
the World Bank in television commercials, the WTO on milk cartons, or the IMF in textbooks. We should. Instead, these institutions
continue to possess an aura of elitism, one that makes an easy target
when the going gets tough.
Perhaps the forms of public participation that we have now are all
we could have reasonably hoped for in the beginning. Public officials
and NGOs are the most likely to be well informed about the issues.
But in this intensely popular age, an age when so much international
activity appears to be increasingly democratized, we must become
more concerned with broadening participation and with rededicating
the institutions of international economic law to openness, transparency, and fairness. In this regard, we have to look to what has
worked and think about what can be usefully adapted to other circumstances. That is the purpose of this paper.
Together with enhancing participation, it is clear that the Bretton
Woods institutions must become better advocates for their respective
causes. At a time of increasing competition for human attention,
these institutions must find ways to penetrate the global public consciousness and convince it of their vital and indispensable role. This
is important if such institutions are to remain at the forefront of concern and are not to be regarded as dispensable when the political
wind changes. The Bretton Woods institutions must therefore make
an effort to become more visible in daily life, an effort that can only
be allied with the ongoing effort toward more openness, transparency, and fairness.
This paper reviews efforts to enhance public participation in the
three Bretton Woods institutions. The paper makes some recommendations as to how public participation can be enhanced based on
common experience and that of other international economic law
systems. This is a particularly important task given that the 1990s
were an extremely fertile decade for the creation of international
economic law institutions, and that many of these new institutions
are looking to already established institutions for precedent. ' For in-

10.

See generally The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing To-
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stance, the new Court of Justice for the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa ("COMESA") in Lusaka is self-consciously
modeled on the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") in Luxembourg."
The Court of Justice of the Andean Community in Quito has made
similar references in its jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the considerable differences in role and approach, logic would suggest that if we
are committed to enhancing public participation, better examples
might serve to guide future developments.

II. THE EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
A. THE WORLD BANK

The World Bank was the first of the Bretton Woods institutions to
be the target of an "NGO swarm" and the one that has responded, in
the view of several critics, best to the challenge. It has done so
largely by creating formal and informal mechanisms of participation,
in the process forging strong links with the NGO community.
The establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel in November 1993 is its most notable effort. Ibrahim Shihata has commented
that the World Bank created the Inspection Panel "driven by a
broader concern that international organizations were not adequately
accountable for their activities and by the perception that the Bank,
as an important instrument of public policy in areas of international
gether the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999) (addressing whether
the proliferation of international courts and tribunals is a systemic problem). At
least a half-dozen international judicial institutions were established, including the
Central American Court of Justice, the dispute settlement system of the WTO, the
Courts of the European Free Trade Association and the Common Market for Eastem and Southern Africa, and the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the
Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa. See id.In addition, a variety of quasi-judicial bodies came into being including the inspection
panels of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank; the dispute settlement system of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFT'A") and its side codes; and the United Nations Compensation
Commission. See id.
11. See Introduction (visited June 11, 2000) <http:' www.comesa.int/court/
courintr.htm> (stating that the COMESA Treaty established the Court of Justice of
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa modeled along the lines of
the European Court of Justice).
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concern, needed to be more open and responsive." The Inspection
Panel inspired the creation of similar mechanisms in the InterAmerican Development Bank ("IADB") in August 1994 and the
Asian Development Bank ("ADB") in December 1995. To early
2000, the World Bank Inspection Panel has been the most active,
registering complaints against eighteen Bank-sponsored projects, six
of which have resulted in an investigation, quasi-investigation, or are
under review.' 3 The receptiveness and transparency of its operation
could well serve as a model for other institutions.
The purpose of the Bank's inspection procedure is to provide an
independent forum for private citizens who believe that a Bank-4
sponsored project has harmed or could harm their rights or interests.'
Although the Inspection Panel is not charged with reviewing the appropriateness of the policies or procedures of the Bank, but merely
with ensuring that the Bank observes them, there has been a movement away from focusing on strict compliance with policies and toward harm caused by Bank-financed projects.'5 This suggests a pur12.

IBRAHIM

F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 9 (2nd ed.

1999).
13. See Inspection Panel Register, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. See The Inspection Panel for the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, International Development Association: Operating Procedures as
adopted by the Panel on August 19, 1994 [hereinafter Operating Procedures], reprinted in SHIHATA, supra note 12, at 377 (explaining that the Inspection Panel is
available to persons directly and adversely affected by the Bank's failure, or its
failure to require others, to comply with its internal policies after it has been determined that Bank management has failed to address such failure).
15. See Inspection Panel Operating Procedures (visited July 18, 2000)
<http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf/Wrequest/6FEE885 D263 E3 B518
525687E00798832> (discussing the Inspection Panel's desire to act as an independent moderator between those "directly and adversely affected" by Bank endeavors); see also Request for Inspection - Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretd HyIdroelectric Project (visited July 18, 2000) <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/IPN/
ipnweb.nsf/WRequest/6FEE885D263E3B518525687E00798832>
(citing
decreased standards of living, health, and economic-well being as the adverse effects
suffered by the residents surrounding the Yacyretd reservoir). According to the
Request, the Bank allegedly violated the following internal policies and procedures: Environmental Policy for Dam and Reservoir Projects, Environmental Assessment, Involuntary Resettlement, Indigenous Peoples, Wildlands, Supervision,
Project Monitoring and Evaluation, Suspension of Disbursements, Cultural Property, Environmental Aspects of Bank Work. See id. See also Shihata, supra note
12, at 32, n.16.
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posive approach by the Inspection Panel to its work that is, at best,
an attempt to resolve problems caused by Bank operations. However,
the Inspection Panel has no power to declare a Bank policy or procedure invalid.
There are three aspects to the Inspection Panel's jurisdiction: personal (ratione personae), subject (ratione materiae) and temporal
(ratione temporis).'6 The Inspection Panel receives inspection requests from an affected party in the territory of the borrowing state,
such party's representative, or by an Executive Director of the
Bank. 7 Each request must be made by a "community of persons" - a
group, association, or other collectivity."' A 1996 clarification to Inspection Panel procedures explains that the term "community of persons" means any two or more persons who share some common interests or concerns.' 9 Specifically, a request must first allege that the
rights or interests of the requesting party have been, or are likely to
be, seriously affected by an act or omission on the part of the Bank.
Second, a request must allege that the act or omission resulted from
the Bank's failure to follow operational policies or procedures pertaining to the design, appraisal, or implementation of a Bankfinanced project. Furthermore, a request must meet two temporal requirements. First, it may not be presented before the requesting party
has taken measures to bring the issue to the attention of the Bank's
management, and the management's response proves unsatisfactory.20 This is the equivalent of an exhaustion of remedies rule. Second, a request may not be presented to the Bank after the loan's
closing date or when the Bank has disbursed ninety-five percent or
more of the loan.2 '
16. See SHIHATA, supra note 12, at 53 (outlining the jurisdictional requirements
as set forth in the Resolution establishing the Inspection Panel).
17. See id. (discussing the eligibility requirements for inspection requests).
18. See id. at 56 (defining "community of persons" as either of an "organization, association, society or other group of individuals").
19. See Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel Clarilications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution (visited July 18, 2000)
<http://wbln0O18.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf/VRelease ABD7787B03330B66
852568D9004CC72E> (clarifying the definition "community of persons").
20. See SHIHATA, supra note 12, at 47-48 (laying out the conditions that must
be met before the Inspection Panel reviews a request).
21. See id. at 49-50 (quoting paragraph 14(c) of the Resolution establishing the
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Despite their apparent formality, the procedure's jurisdictional requirements have been liberally interpreted. A number of reports express the Bank Executive Directors' "hope that the Inspection Panel
process will not focus on 'narrow technical grounds' with regard to
eligibility."2 2 Thus in Argentina/Paraguay-Yacyretci Hydroelectric
Project, a case involving the construction of a power dam and the

displacement of inhabitants living in the dam's wake, a signature
campaign had been undertaken in the affected area.2" The Inspection
Panel observed with respect to personal jurisdiction that:
The Panel is satisfied that the Request meets the eligibility criteria set out
in paragraph 12 of the Resolution and that those signing the Request (i)
represent communities that feel negatively affected by the design and implementation of the Yacyreti Project; and4 (ii) properly authorize Sobrevivencia as their legitimate representative.1

The ratione temporis jurisdictional requirement has not been applied stringently either. Thus in Brazil-Itaparica Resettlement and
Irrigation Project, the fact that the Bank had already disbursed
ninety-five percent of the loan should have prohibited the Inspection

Panel from considering the request further.2" The Inspection Panel
Inspection Panel).
22. Argentina/Paraguay Yacyretii Hydroelectric Project (Loan 2883-I BR)
(November 26, 1996), para. 14 (visited Aug. 11, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.
org/html/ins-panel/Yacyretal22696.htm>; Brazil: Itaparica Resettlement and Irrigation Project (Loan 2883-1 BR)(June 24, 1997), para. 12 (visited Aug. 11, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel/ITAPARIC.htm>.
23. See Request for Inspection - Argentina/Paraguay:Yacyret Hvdroelectric
Project, supra note 15 (documenting the request of SOBREVIVIENCA Friends of
the Earth - Paraguay for inspection of the Yacyreti project on behalf of individuals
living in the affected area).
24. Bangladesh: Jamuna Bridge Project (Credit 2569-BD) (November 26,
1996), para. 54 (visited Aug. 11, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/inspanel/ITAPARIC.htm>. While not meeting this in every aspect, "[t]he fact that
3,000 signed the Request cannot go unnoticed. These people have been left uninformed and out of the design and appraisal stages of the project, including the environmental and re-settlement plans aimed at mitigating adverse effects on people
and nature." See id.
25. See Report and Recommendation - Brazil: ItaparicaResettlement and Irrigation Project (visited July 10, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/inspanel/ITAPARIC.htm> (disagreeing with Bank management's claim that Requesters lacked eligibility because more than ninety-five percent of the loan proceeds
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reasoned, however, that the ninety-five percent threshold was not applicable to the case. A loan supplementing the initial loan existed
and, according to the Inspection Panel, "the Executive Directors intended the 95% disbursement figure to be an indicator of completion
of the project financed by the loan. In this case, all parties agreed that
the project is far from complete. Indeed, less than 50% of the irrigation works are complete. 2 6
The Inspection Panel's procedure is straightforward. It consists of
a preliminary review regarding the admissibility of an affected constituency's Request for Inspection. 2 The Inspection Panel rejects requests that fail to indicate prior contact with the Bank concerning the
issues underlying the complaint; requests submitted by individuals or
unauthorized representatives; correspondence not constituting a request; and frivolous, absurd, or anonymous requests.2' Where the request is likely admissible, the Inspection Panel should notify the
Bank's management and allow it twenty-one days to state whether it
has complied or intends to comply with applicable policies and procedures. 29 In addition, the Inspection Panel can request further clarification from the Bank's management or the requester.
Where the Inspection Panel is not satisfied that management is in
compliance (or intends to bring itself into compliance) with Bank
policies and procedures, it will decide whether to recommend inspection, after presumptively establishing the following:
(1) failure on the part of management to comply has caused or
threatens to cause, a material adverse effect;

had already been disbursed).
26. Id.
27. See Operating Procedures, supra note 14, at 378 (explaining the Inspection
Panel's first procedure pursuant to receiving a request for inspection).
28. See id. at 379 (limiting the types of requests that are within the Inspection
Panel's mandate).
29. See id. at 385 (setting forth the procedures for notifying Bank management
and providing it an opportunity to respond).
30. See id. at 383 (stating, "if the [Inspection Panel] finds the contents of the
Request or documentation on representation insufficient, he/she may ask the Requester to supply further information."). The Inspection Panel may request additional information from either the requester or management for the purposes of
making a more informed recommendation. See id. at 385.
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(2) the alleged violations are of a serious character; and,
(3) the remedial action proposed by management isinadequate."
The Inspection Panel then proceeds on the basis of the request,
management reaction, and its own conclusions to decide whether it
will recommend an investigation to the Bank's Board of Executive
Directors. 32 Actual recommendations issuing from investigations
have ranged from no action to abandonment of the particular project.
During the Inspection Panel process, there are a number of ways in
which the public can participate, and here the record is particularly
strong. Articles 50 and 51 of the Inspection Panel's operating procedures indicate that "any member of the public may provide the Inspector(s), either directly or through the Executive Secretary, with
supplemental information that they believe is relevant to evaluating
the request."3 The Inspection Panel can also ask affected persons,
government officials, or NGO representatives to attend meetings and
make submissions. Any member of the public can provide the Inspection Panel or inspector with a written document not exceeding
ten pages (including summaries and appended supporting documents).34 The Inspection Panel mandates consultations with all interested parties.
The World Bank Inspection Panel process also benefits from the
maintenance of an accurate electronic register, which provides a
transparent record of each event in a given case. This is important.
The global public is therefore not only treated to the final result but
to the process as it evolves. The Bank has also posted suggested formats for Inspection Requests on its website, together with a considerable amount of background documentation such as press releases,
past inspection requests, panel reports, and comments by the Bank's
Executive Directors. All of these sources serve a "channeling function" in that they help to ensure that public input is received in a use-

31. See id. at 387 (determining whether management's conduct meets the
specified criteria for initiating an investigation).
32. See Operating Procedures, supra note 14, at 388 (discussing the means by
which the Inspection undertakes an investigation).

33. Id. at 390-91.
34. See id. (permitting requesters and the public to provide information used by
the Inspection Panel to make its finding).
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ful form. In a real sense, the public is encouraged to participate.
Even with this admirably inclusive system, however, there remain
some surprising oversights. The oldest reports are apparently no
longer available, at least not on the Internet. Moreover, there is no
overt access. Information about the Inspection Panel remains buried
in the World Bank website. Someone would have to know about the
Inspection Panel in order to be able to access it. The degree to which
-to use a Bank-inspired terminology-Project Affected Persons are
informed of their recourse beyond this is difficult to determine. This
situation presents the possibility of a "chicken-and-egg" scenario in
which one is obliged to know about the Inspection Panel before accessing it.
It would be interesting to study how first knowledge of the Inspection Panel came up in the eighteen requests registered to date.
The involvement of the same NGOs in several different requests
suggests that the Inspection Panel process has evolved into the preserve of NGOs working closely with the Bank. Again, this is not
meant to imply that anything negative is happening, only that the
range of real participants is small and runs the risk of leading to a
kind of "group think" about the process. Moreover, it is difficult to
tell if public groups actually spend a long time trying to get the institution's attention before "stumbling upon" the Inspection Panel.
Details in one case suggest that this may occasionally happen," correcting the impression that Inspection Panel is truly accessible. It
would be interesting to examine which frivolous or irrelevant claims
have been turned away under the Bank's screening procedures.
The other cause for concern is the small number of Inspection Requests seen to date. In any given year, the World Bank has hundreds
of projects underway and disburses billions of dollars in related financing. 16 At the risk of appearing to look for trouble where there

35. See Report and Recommendation on Request br Inspection: InLia Etodevelopment Project Rajiv Ghandi (Nagarahole) National Park (visited July 18,
2000) <http://vw.worldbank.org/html/inspanel/Ecodevelopment-Report-recom.
html> (stating that the Requesters brought their claim to the World Bank's attention for the first time in 1994, and again in 1996, and were essentially ignored until
this report in 1998).
36. See WORLD BANK 1999, supra note 2, at 139 (indicating that 241 projects
were approved by the Board in 1997, 286 in 1998, and 299 in 1999).
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may be none, one would expect more problems and more responses
in a system that is truly transparent and functioning. The current
situation suggests that, at a minimum, there is a substantial need for
better knowledge of the Inspection Panel system.
As previously mentioned, the IADB and ADB have established
parallel systems of inspection. While these are broadly similar to the
World Bank Inspection process, they are comparatively little used. In
the case of the IADB, only one complaint has been registered to date,
a companion case to one launched in the World Bank.17 It remains to
be seen how this mechanism will be used. Information indicates that
the IADB's management is considering the introduction of modifications to the Mechanism." There have been no complaints and no
reports registered under the ADB's scheme thus far. 9 Again, the low
usage, in the context of two institutions operating in dozens of countries and disbursing billions of dollars in project-related financing,
suggests that affected persons know and understand little about these
mechanisms.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The IMF is an organization of 182 member countries established
in 1946 to promote international monetary cooperation. 40 Its main
activities are the maintenance of exchange rate stability, promotion
of economic growth, and temporary financial assistance for countries
facing balance of payments problems.4' Over time, there has been

37. See Independent Investigation Mechanism (visited July 18, 2000) <http://
www.iadb.org/cont/poli/indep.htm> (providing an overview of the IADB's Independent Investigation Mechanism ("IADB Mechanism"), which the IADB established on terms similar to that of the World Bank). The principal difference between the two is that the IADB Mechanism lacks a standing panel. See id. Instead,
the IADB maintains a roster of panelists. See id.
38. See MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 313 (P. Sands

ed., 1999) (on file with the author).
39. See ADB's Inspection Policy: A Guidebook (visited July 18, 2000)

<http://www.adb.org/documents/guidelines/inspection/default.asp> (outlining the
procedures for filing a complaint with the ADB's inspection committee).
40. See David D. Driscoll, What is the InternationalMonetar' Fund? (visited
July 19, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm> (discussing

the Fund's origin, structure, and function).
41. See id.
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criticism of the Fund's operations, particularly with respect to the
Fund's conditionality and lack of transparency. 2 The Fund does not
maintain any system of formal dispute settlement. Instead, the IMF's
twenty-four Executive Directors determine the course of Fund operations. 41
Criticism came to a head following the Asian financial crisis of
late 1997 and the resulting financial contagion in other parts of the
world. The Fund's Annual Meeting in April 1998 was a stormy one
and the Fund has since undertaken a number of reforms, collectively
referred to as the New Global Financial Architecture ("NGFA"). Despite the fact that it may not be as far-reaching as originally foreseen,
the NGFA continues to move along the following five parallel
tracks."
(1) transparency, standards, and surveillance,
(2) strengthening financial systems,
(3) orderly integration of international financial markets,
(4) involving the private sector in the prevention and resolution of
financial crises and,
(5) systemic improvements.
All five tracks involve some degree of opening and public engagement, but it is the efforts at greater transparency and private
sector involvement that are most relevant here.
Improving transparency within the Fund takes several forms. The
Fund has, for example, undertaken to make available more information on IMF surveillance of countries through the release of Public
Information Notices ("PINS") following consultations. The release
42. See Martin Crutsinger, IMF Plans New Debt Relief Re/brms,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES AND FREE PRESS, Sept. 27, 1999, availablein LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File (noting that the IMF's pledge to quicken reforms is due
in part to growing criticism of its operations following the Russian corruption
scandal).
43. See Driscoll, supra note 40.

44. See id.
45. A Guide to Progressin Strengthening the Architerture of the International
FinancialSystem (modified Apr. 28, 1999) <http://www.imf.orgiextemal/nplexr
/facts/arch.htm> (on file with American University International Law Reviewl)
[hereinafter Guide to Progress].
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of such notices takes place pursuant to Article IV of the Fund's Articles of Agreement. 6 Article IV requires member countries to provide
information necessary for exchange rate surveillance and to "consult
with [the Fund] on the Member's exchange rate policies."47 In addition, the Fund has given countries the option of permitting the voluntary release of Article IV staff reports. The Fund is also attempting
to make available more information on countries' IMF-supported
economic reform programs. This involves actively encouraging
members to publicly release the all-important Letters of Intent
("LOI"s) and Policy Framework Papers ("PFP"s) that they conclude
with the Fund. In March/April 1999, the IMF Board agreed on a
"strong presumption" that LOIs and PFPs would be made public, and
to proceed with the release of the IMF Chairman's periodic comments on the Use of Fund Resources ("UFR"s). 48 Finally, the Fund is
to make available more information about IMF analyses of policy issues.
With respect to private sector involvement, two programs should
be mentioned. The first is the Fund's effort to increase public participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative ("HIPC").
The initiative has involved the World Bank and other international
institutions, as well as the interested public, in attempting to
strengthen the current framework for debt relief and in exploring the
relationship between debt relief, social policies, and poverty reduction.49 An enhancement of the consultative process began in February
1999. The second initiative is a proposal to make available more information from the private sector in cooperation with the Basle
46. See Articles of Agreement of the InternationalMonetarv Fund (visited July
19, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/aa04.htm> (setting forth the
obligations of IMF members with respect to exchange agreements and surveillance

over them, par values, and separate currencies for member states).
47. Id.
48. See Report of the External Evaluators on the IMFs Research Activities
(visited July 19, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/extev/res/ part3.pdt'>

(stating that one benefit of the "strong presumption" in favor of the IMF's publication of policy papers is that "the staff's work benefits from being subject to public
scrutiny").

49. See The HIPC Debt Initiative <http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/
hipcbr/hipcbr.htm> (commenting that the HIPC's aim is to reduce the external debt
of the poorest nations, and discussing the role of bilateral and multilateral creditors
in this initiative).
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Committee on Banking Supervision and several related international
"
groups dealing with banking, financial regulation, and insurance.
Much of the motivation for these initiatives comes from a realization that the private sector constitutes a potentially valuable source of
indirect information on what is happening in international financial
markets. If government information supplied to the Fund is not always accurate, the market can be another source of intelligence. At
the time of Asian and Russian financial crises, in particular, there
was the distinct impression that some of the problem could have
been averted had private markets been tracked more closely." Therefore, in order to improve market surveillance, the Fund's staff has
strengthened high frequency contacts with the private sector to
monitor developments in capital flows and market positions. Furthermore, the Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics
("IATF") has developed an electronic presentation of creditor-side
data in conjunction with the World Bank, IMF, BIS, and the OECD.5"
Because of its close association with the sensitive area of sovereign debt, the Fund faces a unique challenge in enhancing public
participation in its work. On the one hand, the IMF is seeking to expand the private sector's involvement in providing information that
may help to prevent and resolve financial crises. On the other, it must
remain conscious of its role as a lender to governments, with oftenprivileged information and access to government borrowers. In this
sense, the flow of information foreseen may often be uni-directional,
with little benefit for market players and, therefore, little incentive
for them to cooperate. 3

50. See Guide to Progress,supra note 45.

51. See id.
52. See OECD News Release: Joint BIS-AfF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on
External Debt (visited July 22, 2000)

<http:/iwww.oecdwash.org/PRESS/

PRESRELS/1999/news99025.htm> (commenting that the objective of the Inter-

Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics "is
to facilitate access to a single set of
data bringing together information on components of countries' external debt that
is currently compiled and published separately by the contributing institutions")

53. Part of these very specific proposals has been to expand the IMF's dialogue

with the private sector. The IMF Executive Committee has considered the need to
balance improved flow over international financial markets with the risks related to
inside information. In April 1999, the Fund's Interim Committee endorsed effective communications with private capital markets.
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C. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The WTO was created in April 1994 as a successor to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") at a time of rapidly
emerging aspirations for public participation in international law.
The fact that NGOs could not be directly involved in the work of the
WTO or its meetings was contentious from the beginning. The fact
that the new organization featured a system of binding dispute settlement and sanctions for non-compliance made NGOs and other
members of the public anxious to become more involved. The sense
of exclusion was sharpened by the fact that WTO dispute settlement
can involve many issues apart from trade. NGOs often considered
that they could play a useful role in informing the process on these
points.
WTO dispute settlement normally consists of a sequence of consultations between member countries, hearings before panels, and
appeals before the WTO Appellate Body. The process is conducted
according to rules set out in the WTO Dispute Settlement Under4 If a panel or the
standing ("DSU"), part of the WTO Agreement."
Appellate Body concludes that an infringement has occurred, DSU
Article 19 requires that the Appellate Body recommend the country
concerned brings its laws "into conformity" with the WTO Agreement." Most often the WTO has interpreted this to require offending
countries to withdraw or modify the infringing measure. Alternatively, countries may agree to voluntary compensation in the form of
tariff concessions or, as a last resort, the they may seek permission to
suspend trade concessions in retaliation. 6 As of January 2000, the
great majority of cases had been satisfactorily resolved. The WTO
54. See WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 3(2), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 404 (1994), 33 1.L.M.

1125 (setting forth the procedures for adjudicating and administering remedies
within the WTO system).
55. See id. art. 19(1) (recommending compliance with a WTO panel or Appellate Body decision).

56. See id. art. 22(1) (providing that although countries may voluntarily request
compensation or suspension of concessions, the dispute settlement body prefers
full implementation of their recommendations in order to bring measures into conformity with the covered agreements).
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has only authorized retaliation three times in two matters.'
At present, however, the process of dispute settlement takes place
almost entirely out of public view. Countries will occasionally announce the decision to begin consultations, but there are few opportunities to learn what provisions are in issue and what arguments are
being made. Members of the public are not allowed to attend panel
or Appellate Body hearings. The WTO maintains no on-line registry,
has an internally generated index-the State of Play-that has been
known to be inaccurate, and does not indicate the continuing progress of cases. On the whole, the process of the system, as opposed to
its results, remains surprisingly opaque.
Some change came about in United States - Import Prohibitionof
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.' This dispute between the
United States, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand centered
around a provision of the U.S. EndangeredSpecies Act,' which prohibited the United States' importation of shrimp from countries not
certified "turtle-friendly" by the U.S. State Department.' In the
course of proceedings before the panel in July 1997, two U.S.-based
NGOs, the Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for International Environmental Law, submitted a brief to the dispute resolution panel detailing significant information related to the six turtle
species in issue. The panel rejected consideration of the information,
ruling that "accepting non-requested information from nongovernmental sources would be... incompatible with the DSU as
57. See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (upholding a prior panel's
ruling that the European Union's import restrictions on bananas violated provisions
of the GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services); European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (concluding that the European Union's import restrictions on meat and meat products derived from cattle to which hormones had
been administered violated provisions of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).
58. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Panel Decision].
59. See Act of Nov. 21, 1989, P.L. 101-162, Title IV,§ 609, 103 Stat. 1037 (to
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537).
60. Non-governmental organizations attempted to independently participate in
the Shrimp Panel Decision at the panel level, but this was rejected and the point
was not appealed.
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currently applied.",61 It indicated, however, that the United States was
free to append the brief to its own submission.
The United States did so and appealed the point before the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body then faced two issues:
(1) the admissibility of non-governmental materials submitted independently to panels; and
(2) the inclusion of non-governmental materials in government
submissions.62
The Appellate Body's interpretation turned on three considerations. First, there was the language of DSU Article 13(1), which
states that a panel has "the right to seek information and technical
advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate."
Likewise, the Appellate Body stated, "a panel has the discretionary
authority either to accept and consider or reject information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not. '"6 Second,
the Appellate Body observed that DSU Article 12.1 authorizes departures from DSU procedures and that both the Article 12 and 13
powers allow a panel to discharge its duties under DSU Article 11 to
make "an objective assessment of the matter."65 The Appellate Body
therefore concluded that the word "seek" in Article 13(1) should be
read liberally, allowing NGOs to submit briefs with prior permission,
and indicated that where 66material is received, consultation with the
parties should take place.
The reaction to this decision was mixed. NGOs and a number of
supportive Western governments hailed it. Other countries, including
the plaintiffs in the Shrimp case opposed the decision, arguing that it
impermissibly altered their rights and obligations under the WTO

61.

Shrimp Panel Decision, supra note 58, para. 7.8.
62. See Shrimp Appellate Body Ruling, supra note 6, para. 187(a) (addressing
the issue of whether "accepting non-requested information from non-governmental
sources would be incompatible with the provisions of the DSU as currently applied").
63.
64.
65.
66.
NGOs

Id., para. 102.
Id., para. 108.
Id., para. 106.
See id., para. 187(a) (finding that accepting unsolicited information from
is not incompatible with the DSU).
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Agreement. They have sought a review of the ruling's propriety in
the context of ongoing DSU review.
There are several mechanical problems with the Shrimp ruling on
public participation. To begin, the existing lack of transparency in
the process makes it difficult to determine when a case is actually before a panel. It is thus hard to know when a submission should be
prepared. The Appellate Body in the Shrimp case also suggested that
requests to submit could be sent to the dispute resolution panel. The
WTO does not publish a list of panel chairs, so that one cannot know
with any certainty to whom one is to send a request. It would be useful, for instance, for the WTO Director-General to designate one person-perhaps the WTO's Director of External Relations-to act as a
contact point for documents and make this known on its website.
More generally, it appears that the WTO needs to formulate a standard procedure for dealing with submissions the way that the World
Bank has for the Inspection Panel. This could include a sample request, guidelines, a suggested format, and copies of past public submissions. Again, all of these procedures could be included on the
WTO website. As things now stand, most members of the public do
not know about the Shrinp ruling which, with passing time and limited use, recedes from view.
This observation leads to comment on the actual use of public
submissions in WTO dispute settlement. As mentioned, since October 1998 there has been one submission - by two Tasmanian salmon
farmers. Given recent events at Seattle and the abiding interest they
demonstrate, one would have expected a deluge of interest. Instead,
the contrast between public interest and formal participation could
hardly be more stark. The record in fact suggests that the public is
very poorly informed about opportunities for formal participation
and that the possibility for formal public participation is in fact illusory. Moreover, the WTO has done little to publicize it. The possibility of making a submission is not mentioned on the WTO website,
nor is it referred to in WTO promotional material.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusion must be that in this new era of enhanced participation there remain significant barriers to genuine public participation
in the institutions of international economic law. These threaten their
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legitimacy. What follows are a series of conclusions and recommendations to further enhance informal and formal participation, and to
assist these institutions in building support among a broader global
constituency.
1. With respect to informalparticipation:
Each of these institutions must constantly be on the lookout for
opportunities to build new constituencies while maintaining existing
ones. This will be difficult due to resource constraints, but each of
these institutions must begin to reach beyond traditional networks of
NGOs and build support at the grassroots level.
There must be more considered use of informal contacts. Missions, visits to headquarters, and symposia should be opportunities to
meet with individuals and groups who have not been met in the past.
The same bureaucrats and NGO officials should not be the ones
automatically included in annual training sessions.
2.

With respect to formal participation:

The central problem appears to be a clash between what the legalization of international relations suggests to the public, with its broad
notions of openness, access to proceedings, and the ability to meaningfully participate by way of intervention, versus the reality of the
system so far developed, which is limited, hard to learn about, and
provides no real possibility to challenge the central tenets of the system. International dispute settlement is very different from comparable domestic models, legal though it may be. It is this dissonance of
perception that is the most frustrating for members of the public and
is u~idoubtedly the optic through which they see efforts at public
participation thus far, halting, slow and fundamentally inadequate.
For this reason, I would recommend a number of improvements:
(a) At the pre-hearingstage, there is limited - and in many cases
no - access to pleadings. Consciousness of what disputes are really
about remains almost exclusively a state-to-state affair, supplemented in a few cases by a few, well-connected NGOs who may
have some involvement in initiating the claims or access to bureaucratic channels. Members of the public are forced to rely on press
releases and whatever is made available electronically, which is often interstitial and coherent only to insiders. Certain proceedings,
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such as those under the North American Free Trade Agreement, Ch.
11, are defacto entirely secret. 61 It is impossible to find out anything
about them unless, again, one has access to the relevant channels or
is a direct participant.
(b) At the hearingstage, there is rarely public access to the hearings. The proceedings take place behind closed doors, well away
from public scrutiny. We do not know what is said. We do not know
how the panelists reacted. In short, this does not improve confidence
in this new international judiciary, leaving the impression of Star
Chamber-type proceedings;
(c) At the hearingstage as well, no transcripts are made available,
and there is therefore no accountability. No questions can be asked.
No errors can be pointed out. The systems that have been created do
not instill faith that true justice is being done.
Among those systems with dispute settlement on mandated timelines, such as the WTO, there is no indication of a case's progress in
the post-hearingstage. The public is left entirely uninformed of the
progress of a case, or when a final decision can be expected, reinforcing the public's sense that they are merely bystanders in the process.
It would also be appropriate to begin identifying a set of necessary
criteria for greater participation in international economic law. To
use a popular metaphor, what would the "toolbox" consist of? At a
minimum, in order to instill public confidence in these mechanisms
of international economic adjudication the following appear necessary:

67. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.Mex., Annex 1137.4, 32 I.L.M. 605 (stating, "[w]here Canada is the disputing
Party, either Canada or a disputing investor that is a party to the arbitration may
make an award public"). The NAFTA countries have agreed to varying rules for
each with respect to the publication of awards; no NAFTA country has yet made
awards public. See id. Cf International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration
Proceedings, Ch. 1, Rule 15, available at <htip://ww.epms.nliarbit/icsid.htm>
(noting, "[t]he deliberations of the Tribunals shall take place in private and remain
secret"). See generally Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NA..F7A: What Are
the Implicationsfor Sovereignty? 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281, 287, n.16 (1998) (discussing the secrecy element of NAFTA proceedings in the context of the Ethyl
case).
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(i) A visible contact point. With respect to formal participation,
for instance, no institution surveyed here has any mention of this at
its Internet portal. This situation leads to a "chicken-and-egg" scenario: you need to know about the mechanism to search for it. There
should be mention of opportunities for involvement on the first page
of its website, and a specific office, project or person should be made
the contact point. Instructions to send a request or submission to "the
chair of the panel" are insufficient when one does not know whether
a panel has been established.
(ii) An accessible register. This should contain more than a skeletal outline of the case. Ideally, it should be set in a chronological order, and updated every time a principal step takes place, as now appears to be the case with the World Bank Inspection Panel. Those
responsible for information design should consider posting institutionally mandated deadlines as an external reference point as an
added discipline on the system. Thus, for example, where a WTO
panel has four and a half months to complete its deliberations and
render a report in a case involving prohibited subsidies, that date
should be posted ex ante completion of the report and visible for all
to see whether the panel has met its mandate. Where it has not, an
explanation should be available.
(iii)A public dossier. As in domestic procedures, documents
should be presumptively public, available prior to the process.
(d) Public hearings. The very center of the proceedings must be
public and, in all but exceptional circumstances, publicized. This
now happens within the ICJ. Consideration should be given to other
means of making access to hearings available, through transcripts of
the proceedings.
3. Finally, with respect to building greater public support:
(a) Each of these institutions must review opportunities to build
new links with civil society. For instance, regular town hall-type
meetings could be organized akin to the Joint Public Advisory
Committee scheme in place under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation.68 Employees of these institutions could
68. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sep. 9.
1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 16, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (providing advice on matters within
the scope of the agreement as well as providing relevant technical, scientific, or
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combine official work with opportunities to explain programs and
receive input in civil society. Consideration could even be given to
accepting private donations, akin to those contributed by Ted Turner
to the United Nations, in order to build an independent financial base
for certain activities. For instance, more internships could be offered.
(b) Each of these institutions must seek greater public visibility.
Often, visibility is considered negatively by these institutions. This
has to change. The institutions must realize that it is with visibility
that they become relevant and indispensable to the broader public.
One means of doing this would be to advertise more.
(c) Each of these institutions must review past work, collection,
and disseminate follow-up. This is important, and perhaps more important than is often realized. What has happened in a case after the
formal close of proceedings is rarely tracked and publicized. All institutions of international law should be doing a better job of this. In
the case of the WTO, for instance, national reports made to the DSB
on compliance should be made available and under WTO derestriction procedures are, but the opaqueness of the existing WTO
Internet search engine makes follow-up very difficult to determine.
There is no central repository for the achievements of these institutions. In certain instances results can be determined by examining
annual reports, but even this information is interstitial. One has to
have the time and patience to go back and assemble it. Hence, no
idea remains of the considerable work performed to date, and ultimately, the value of these institutions in context.
This last suggestion is perhaps symptomatic of a larger problem in
modem society, that we are intensely forward-looking. When a
problem occurs, there is nothing to fall back on. Those who speak for
these institutions are poorly equipped to defend them, and we therefore have the awkward situation of international organizations that
are scorned, without appreciation for what they have accomplished.
This leads to a second point, and that is that we live in an age of accountability which is also an age of intense competition for our attention. We must be vigilant to constantly remind the global public
of the importance of these institutions, both through possibilities for

other information to the Secretariat).
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their participation and through campaigns of heightened visibility." I
would suggest outreach, advertising and the need for dialogue, not
only with well-informed NGO's, but with wider constituencies of the
global general public.
In summary, what we appear to have in many instances is a system
of participation that has become a conversation between epistemic
communities rather than a truly public exercise. It is the preserve of a
group of non-governmental organizations, often with close links to
the bureaucracy, instead of wider fora for dialogue. This is not to
suggest that any of this is inherently bad, but that the institutions of
international economic law must recognize what has happened and
look beyond for genuine popular support. One might fear that more
"spontaneous expression" could degenerate into a torrent of irrelevancy, but it is important to wait and see what actually happens. The
evidence does not suggest that the floodgates have opened to date.

69. See Robert D. Hayton, The Matter of Public Participation, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 275, 275-281 (1993) (discussing whether the public participation
process is adequate between two North American bi-national water resources
commissions).

